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Abstract
The holdup problem arises when parties negotiate to divide the surplus generated by
their ex ante noncontractable investments. We study this problem in a model which,
unlike the stylized static model, allows the parties to continue to invest until they agree on
the terms of trade. These possible investment dynamics overturn the conventional wisdom
dramatically. First, the holdup problem need not entail underinvestment-type inefficiencies
when the parties are sufficiently patient. Second, inefficiencies can arise unambiguously,
but the reason for their occurrence differs from the one recognized by the static model.
This latter finding sheds new light on the design of contracts and organizations.
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1 Introduction
A recurring problem in economics concerns an agent who must make a sunk investment with-
out being guaranteed to receive its social return. One such phenomenon arises when trading
partners negotiate to divide their trade surplus after making relationship-specific investments.
This problem, referred to as holdup, is inherent in many bilateral exchanges. For instance,
workers and firms often invest in firm-specific assets prior to negotiating for wages. Manufac-
turers and suppliers often customize their equipment and production processes to the special
needs of their partners, knowing well that future (re)negotiation will confer part of the bene-
fit from customization to their partners. While these investments increase the value of their
transaction, they often occur without contractual protection, thus putting investing parties at
the risk of holdup. The conventional wisdom is that the risk of holdup would lead parties to
underinvest in specific assets (see Grout, 1984; and Tirole, 1986). The purpose of this paper
is to reexamine this conventional wisdom.1
Our point of departure is the observation that the stylized model predicting underinvest-
ment does not capture some rich dynamic interaction present in many trading relationships.
For instance, the standard two-stage model assumes that the trading partners invest only once
and that bargaining can only begin after all investments are completed. In practice, however,
the timing of investment and bargaining is — at least to some extent — chosen endogenously
by the parties, and the investment and bargaining stages are often intertwined. In particular,
when one makes a specific investment targeted at a particular partner, it is plausible for him
to approach his partner to negotiate trade terms, before his investment is completed.
In the current paper, we develop a model that introduces dynamic interaction between
investment and bargaining, by allowing the parties to continue to invest until they agree on how
to divide the trading surplus. Specifically, our extensive form has the following structure. In
each period, both parties choose how much to invest, and then a (randomly chosen) party offers
the terms of trade. If that offer is accepted, then trade occurs according to the agreed terms
and the game ends. If that offer is rejected, however, the game moves on to the next period
1For this reason, we do not ask why the parties do not contract prior to investments and what contract would
be most effective at alleviating the inefficiencies — the central questions raised in the recent debates on the
incomplete contracts paradigm (see Tirole (1999) for a survey). These questions would be relevant only after
finding an affirmative answer to our question: Do inefficiencies necessarily arise in the absence of any contracts?
See our remarks on the incomplete contracts literature later in this section and Section 6.
2
without trade, and the parties can further invest to add to the existing stock of investments,
which is again followed by a round of bargaining of the same form, and the same process is
repeated until there is agreement. Except for the investment dynamics, our model retains the
essential features of the static model of holdup: we assume that no ex ante contracts exist and
that the trade partners invest before they begin negotiating the terms of trade and complete
their investments before they agree on trade.
We obtain two novel results. First, despite the holdup problem, investments can be efficient
when the parties discount the future very little (or when the interval between periods shrinks
to zero). This asymptotic efficiency result follows from the dynamic nature of our model.
On the equilibrium path, the parties split their joint surplus in proportion to their relative
bargaining power, so holdup arises just as in the static model. But holdup need not entail
poor incentives for investment since the incentives also depend on how they will split the
surplus if a party deviates from his equilibrium level of investment. The deviator’s payoff in
turn depends on what he plans to do with his investment should they fail to agree in the current
period. Suppose that the deviator is expected to make up for the shortfall by investing up to
the original equilibrium level in the next period. Then, his continuation value will include the
(discounted) cost of this additional investment. Consequently, when it is his partner’s turn to
offer, she will rationally subtract from her standard offer (discounted value of his share of the
future pie) the investment cost he will save if they agree in the current period. This feature
generates an additional penalty against underinvestment (than the standard sharing of the
pie would), thus generating a stronger incentive for investment than in the static game. This
improved incentive for investment in turn makes credible the original belief that the investor
will make up for the shortfall in the future if he deviates. In fact, if the parties discount the
future very little, each party will have almost no incentive to deviate from any investment
level below the first-best one since a dollar underinvestment results in an offer from his partner
(when he makes an offer) that is almost a dollar lower.2
Second, we identify circumstances under which holdup entails underinvestment unambigu-
ously. In our dynamic model, inefficiencies may arise from the imbalance between a party’s
bargaining power and the (relative) social value of his investment. As mentioned above, on
the equilibrium path the parties split the joint surplus according to their bargaining power.
2When the party in question makes an offer, he internalizes the marginal social return by virtue of being a
residual claimant in that case.
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Hence, a party cannot be induced to make an investment that costs more than he expects to
receive from bargaining. A socially desirable investment will thus not be made if the investor
does not have a strong enough bargaining power to recoup his investment cost.3 In this case,
the investment would be inefficient, but the reason for the inefficiency is different from the one
recognized by the standard model, as will become clear through our analysis.
Our model is related to three branches of literature. First, the current paper sheds some new
light on the incomplete contracts literature. This literature, largely taking the underinvestment
result as given, has focused on how contractual and organizational safeguards can mitigate
the holdup problem: Some authors have proposed vertical integration as a solution (Klein,
Crawford and Alchian, 1978; and Williamson, 1979), while others have proposed allocating
asset ownership (Grossman and Hart, 1986; and Hart and Moore, 1990), financial control rights
(Aghion and Bolton, 1992; and Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994), hierarchical authority (Aghion
and Tirole, 1997), to name a few. This literature has been criticized for failing to consider the
full set of feasible arrangements. While the empirical relevance of contractual incompleteness
is widely acknowledged, there is a sense in which the incomplete contracts literature has not
provided sufficient justifications for the predicted forms of contractual incompleteness (see
Tirole (1999) for the recent survey). The current paper can be seen as reconciling this apparent
tension, since our main result would imply that the underlying incentive problem may not be
too worrisome even in the absence of any ex ante contracts.4
Second, our model is closely related to non-cooperative bargaining models. In particular, it
can be seen as an extension of Rubinstein’s (1982) model to allow for the pie to be endogenously
determined through investments. Given a reasonable restriction on Markov Perfect equilibria,
our model predicts no delay in agreement, as in the Rubinstein model. His uniqueness result
does not carry over to the current model, though, since different future investment plans
generate different incentives for investments, which in turn makes those plans sustainable.
Busch and Wen (1995) obtain multiple Perfect equilibria in a bargaining model in which
negotiators play a normal-form game repeatedly whenever they disagree. Their disagreement
game does not affect the pie, so inefficiency arises only through delay. Further, their multiple
3This is also true in the static model. This issue never arises there, however, since any static equilibrium
trivially satisfies this feature. In our dynamic model, a candidate equilibrium may sustain a much higher
investment than in the static equilibrium, so the issue of individual rationality becomes relevant.
4Section 6 contains more detailed discussion on the implications of our results for the incomplete contracts
view on organization.
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equilibria correspond to different bargaining shares, which are supported by threats contingent
on payoff irrelevant histories. By contrast, the inefficiency and multiplicity of equilibria in our
model follows from the endogeneity of the bargaining stake. Also, threats contingent on payoff
irrelevant histories play no role in our model, since we focus on Markov Perfect equilibria.
Last but not least, our model is related to the literature on “contribution games” which
studies the incentives for voluntary contribution to public projects (see Marx and Matthews
(2000), Gale (2000), Lockwood and Thomas (2001), Admati and Perry (1991) and Bagnoli and
Lipman (1989)).5 Marx and Matthews (2000) and Lockwood and Thomas (2001) show that,
if contributors are allowed to contribute over time, the standard free-riding problem can be
almost overcome by gradual accumulation strategies and the accompanying dynamic threat.
The holdup problem is similar to the free-riding problem arising in the contribution games,
but our model differs crucially on several accounts. First, the parties explicitly bargain to
split the surplus in our model, rather than following some exogenous sharing rule (implied
by the public good technology). This extra strategic interaction is largely responsible for the
efficiency result we obtain. Second, there is a difference in the way surplus is realized. In our
model, surplus can arise only once when the parties trade, even though the level of surplus
realizable from trade increases continuously with investments. Hence, future accumulation
of investments can be achieved only by foregoing current trade, i.e., by postponing surplus
realization. By contrast, the contribution models assume that the timing of surplus realization
as well as the level of surplus depends completely on the accumulated investments. Hence, a
future accumulation does not require the postponement of surplus realization.6 This difference
in environment implies that the gradual accumulation strategies proposed by the contribution
game literature would be unsustainable in our game.7 In fact, investments take place all at
5Gale (2000) studies monotone games with positive spill-over, while Lockwood and Thomas (2001) consider
repeated games with irreversible action variables. Both include contribution games as a special case.
6This remark applies even in the so-called “payoff jump” case considered by Marx and Matthews (2000),
in which contributors realize no flow surplus until reaching a certain accumulation target. Clearly, there is no
current surplus to be sacrificed to enable future accumulation, prior to reaching the target.
7Suppose that the parties split the surplus according to some exogenous sharing rule (rather than through
bargaining), but that the surplus is realized only when they agree to trade (hence keeping our second fea-
ture). Since the realizable surplus increases continuously with investments in our model, the gradual investment
strategies would involve ever-shrinking investment increments toward the accumulation target (see Marx and
Matthews (2000) and Lockwood and Thomas (2001)). This latter feature means that the additional surplus
that would be obtained by delaying trade becomes arbitrarily small as the target is approached, relative to the
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once in our (selected) equilibria. Finally, the contribution models consider investments that are
perfectly substitutable or symmetric in their effect on the surplus. We consider a wide range
of cases in which parties’ investments are imperfectly substitutable or even complementary,
and more importantly, have asymmetric effects on the surplus, including the extreme case in
which only one party invests. Our results hold regardless of the underlying technologies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the model and
the solution concept. Section 3 illustrates the main ideas through an example. The general
model is then analyzed in Section 4 (and Section 5 which relaxes our refinement). Section 6
concludes.
2 The model
2.1 The description of the dynamic holdup game
Two risk-neutral parties, a buyer and a seller, make sunk investments for the purpose of a
potential trade of a good. Time flows in discrete periods of equal length, t = 0, 1, 2, ..., and
the players discount future utility by the common per-period discount factor, δ ∈ [0, 1). Trade
can occur in any period and the parties can invest in any period up to (i.e., including) the
period of trade. The parties can add to the existing stock of investments but they cannot
disinvest. Investments are measured by the costs incurred, and the costs are incurred at the
time of investments. A trade that occurs in period t after the cumulative investments of b ≥ 0
by the buyer and of s ≥ 0 by the seller create a joint surplus of φ(b, s) for the parties in that
period if they trade (which amounts to δtφ(b, s) in period 0 terms). No trade yields no surplus.
Trade surplus, φ, can be interpreted in a number of ways, including the following:
• Bilateral trade: Trade may require costly production on the part of the seller. Suppose
that the seller can deliver q ∈ Q ⊂ R+ units of a good to the buyer at the cost of c(q, b, s),
yielding the gross surplus of v(q, b, s) for the buyer. Assuming that v(0, b, s) = c(0, b, s) =
0, we can take φ(b, s) := maxq∈Q{v(q, b, s) − c(q, b, s)} as the maximized joint surplus
(that realizes as a result of an efficient quantity choice), with the standard assumption
cost of postponing surplus realization, so future accumulation (which would require postponing trade) becomes
no longer credible, thus unraveling the gradual accumulation strategies. Gradual accumulation is sustainable in
the contribution models since it does not require postponing surplus realization, regardless of whether payoffs
jump at the target or not.
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that quantity is contractible. Such a specification has been frequently adopted in many
incomplete contract articles.8
• Partnership/Team Production: The parties may be partners in a joint project. They
initially make investments (b, s), which could include developing business plans, purchas-
ing buildings and equipment, hiring employees. They then bargain to split the joint
surplus, φ(b, s), resulting from their joint project. Unlike the trade example, partners’
individual revenue contributions may be difficult to identify, but, as in the trade example,
their project requires a joint decision.
To capture the idea that the parties can invest until they conclude the negotiation, we
adopt the following extensive form. Each period is divided into two stages: investment and
bargaining. In the investment stage, the parties simultaneously choose (incremental) amounts
to invest. Once the investments are sunk, they become public. In the bargaining stage, a party
is chosen randomly to offer to his partner a share of the surplus that would result from trade
at that point. We assume that the buyer is chosen with probability α ∈ [0, 1], and the seller
is chosen with the remaining probability.9 If the offer is accepted, then trade takes place, the
surplus is split according to the agreed-upon shares between the two parties, and the game
ends. If the offer is rejected, then the game moves on to the next period without trade, and the
same process is repeated; i.e., the players can make incremental investments, which is followed
by a new bargaining round with a random proposer. Note that, if the game ends after the first
period (or equivalently δ = 0), our model will coincide with the standard static model. For
future reference, this one-period truncation of our game will be referred to as the static holdup
game.
We make several assumptions about the social surplus function, φ. First, we assume that
φ(·, ·) is strictly positive, twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly con-
8Note also that this specification allows the investments to be both cooperative and selfish. (A selfish
investment directly benefits the investor while a cooperative investment directly benefits the trading partner
of the investor. See Che and Hausch (1999).) Che and Hausch (1999) showed that cooperative investments
limit the ability of contracting to solve the holdup problem. Our results below do not depend on the nature of
investments.
9This part of the game represents a simple modification of the Rubinstein game, suggested by Binmore
(1987). This model separates the issue of relative bargaining power from the discount factor and eliminates the
(arbitrary) bias associated with who becomes the first proposer. The subsequent results will remain qualitatively
the same, in particular when the parties discount very little, if one adopts the Rubinstein model.
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cave,10 and limb→∞
φ(b,·)
b = 0 and lims→∞
φ(·,s)
s = 0. These assumptions ensure existence of
a unique pair of efficient investments. Further, we require that either φbs(b, s) ≤ 0 for all
(b, s) ≥ (0, 0) or φbs(b, s) > 0 for all (b, s) ≥ (0, 0). This last assumption means that invest-
ments are either complements or substitutes, globally. It simplifies the subsequent analyses
and the interpretation of our results.
We now establish some benchmark outcomes. The first-best investment pair is defined as
(b∗, s∗) = argmax
b,s
{φ(b, s)− b− s},
which is unique due to the strict concavity of φ. We assume that (b∗, s∗) > (0, 0).11 It is useful
to consider the following (hypothetical) best response functions for the buyer12
Bδ(s) = argmax
b
{αφ(b, s)− (1− (1− α)δ)b}
and for the seller
Sδ(b) = argmax
s
{(1− α)φ(b, s)− (1− αδ)s}.
Observe that B1(·) and S1(·) are the socially efficient responses. Thus, (b∗, s∗) satisfies b∗ =
B1(s∗) and s∗ = S1(b∗). Consider the other extreme case, with δ = 0: B0(·) and S0(·) represent
the best response functions of the buyer and the seller, respectively, in the static holdup game.
Notice that the above objective functions exhibit strict increasing differences in (b; δ) and in
(s; δ), respectively, for α ∈ (0, 1). Hence, B0(s) ≤ Bδ(s) ≤ B1(s) for any s ≥ 0 and δ ∈ (0, 1),
and S0(b) ≤ Sδ(b) ≤ S1(b) for all b ≥ 0 and δ ∈ (0, 1). Meanwhile, strict concavity of φ(·, ·)
implies that
φbbφss > φ
2
bs ⇔ B′δS′δ < 1,
from which it follows that, for any δ ∈ (0, 1), Bδ(·) intersects Sδ(·) only once. Let (bδ, sδ)
denote such an intersection (that is, bδ = Bδ(sδ) and sδ = Sδ(bδ)). Again (b1, s1) = (b∗, s∗),
while (b0, s0) characterize the subgame perfect equilibrium investments of the static holdup
game.
10The strict concavity assumption rules out the case of perfect substitutable investments (i.e., φ(b, s) =
φ(b + s)), which is plausible in many public good provision problem (see Marx and Matthews (2000), for
instance). While we assume strict concavity for ease of exposition, all subsequent results hold for the case of
perfectly substitutable investments. See Remark 1.
11Allowing one component of the first-best pair to be zero incorporates the possibility that only one party
invests.
12The best response functions are well-defined due to the strict concavity of φ.
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2.2 The equilibrium conditions
In our model, the stake of bargaining at any given time depends only on the stock of investments
accumulated prior to that time. Consequently, the stock of aggregate investments constitutes
the only payoff-relevant part of the history. A Markov strategy profile specifies for each period
(incremental) investment choices by the two parties as functions of the pair of total investments
accumulated up to the last period, and, for the bargaining stage, a price offer and a response
rule for each party — a function mapping from an offer to {accept, reject}— both as functions
of the current-period stock of total investments. We look for a subgame perfect equilibrium in
Markov strategies, called Markov Perfect equilibrium.
Formally, we can characterize the equilibrium by a pair of value functions, 〈β, σ〉 : R2+ →
R2, that map from the current period stock of investments into the (continuation) values for
the buyer and the seller at that period (before a proposer is randomly chosen), and by a
policy rule, E ≡ 〈x, y〉 : R2+ → R2+, that maps the last-period stock of investments into the
current-period stock of investments by the buyer and the seller.
The necessary and sufficient conditions for a Markov Perfect equilibrium are that, for each
(b, s) ∈ R2+, and for (b′, s′) = E(b, s),
β(b, s) = αmax{φ(b, s)− δ[σ(b′, s′)− (s′ − s)], δ[β(b′, s′)− (b′ − b)]}
+(1− α)δ[β(b′, s′)− (b′ − b)], (1)
σ(b, s) = (1− α)max{φ(b, s)− δ[β(b′, s′)− (b′ − b)], δ[σ(b′, s′)− (s′ − s)]}
+αδ[σ(b′, s′)− (s′ − s)], (2)
b′ ∈ argmax
b˜≥b
{β(b˜, s′)− (b˜− b)}, (3)
s′ ∈ argmax
s˜≥s
{σ(b′, s˜)− (s˜− s)}. (4)
The buyer’s value function is explained as follows. Given an existing stock of (b, s), a
buyer is chosen with probability α to make an offer. He can either make an offer which is
unacceptable to the seller, in which case he obtains his net discounted continuation value,
δ[β(b′, s′)− (b′ − b)], or he can make the lowest offer acceptable to the seller, which leaves the
seller with her discounted continuation value, δ[σ(b′, s′)−(s′−s)], whichever is more profitable.
With probability 1−α, the buyer becomes a responder. Based on the above reasoning, he will
earn his discounted continuation value, δ[β(b′, s′)− (b′ − b)], no matter how the seller resolves
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her trade-off. The seller’s value function has a similar explanation. The next two equations,
(3) and (4), state that the players choose their incremental investment pair as mutual best
responses, taking into account the future evolution of the game. Clearly, these conditions are
necessary for Markov Perfection. They are also sufficient, since there is no profitable (possibly
non-Markovian) deviation, given the single-period deviation principle.
As will be seen, there are many Markov Perfect equilibria. Throughout, we will focus on
Markov Perfect equilibria that satisfy the following properties:
Refinement (P): (i) If E(b, s) ≥ (b˜, s˜) ≥ (b, s) then E(b, s) = E(b˜, s˜), and (ii) if E(b, s) =
(b, s), then x(b+ , s) = b+  and y(b, s+ ) = s+ , for all  > 0.
The first property requires an equilibrium policy rule to select investment reactions consis-
tently. To see this, let (b′, s′) = E(b, s). By (3) and (4), (b′, s′) is a mutual best response when
they start with a stock, (b, s). Then, (b′, s′) is also a mutual best response if they start with a
stock of (b˜, s˜), (b, s) ≤ (b˜, s˜) ≤ (b′, s′). If this is the only mutual best response pair, then clearly
(b′, s′) = E(b˜, s˜), so this refinement would impose no restriction. (P)-(i) imposes a restriction,
though, when there are multiple best responses, in which case it requires selecting the same
pair, (b′, s′) = E(b˜, s˜). The second property says that if both parties stop investing further
starting from a certain stock, then each of them should stop investing further, when starting
from a stock containing a higher sunk investment of his own and the same sunk investment
of his opponent. Combined together, these properties impose a passivity restriction on the
players’ out-of-the equilibrium beliefs: any deviation by an investor from an equilibrium plan
triggers the least amount of revisions on the beliefs about what that investor will do next
period if no agreement is reached in the current period. It is worth emphasizing that this
refinement can only limit the set of equilibria. In other words, the refinement plays no role in
sustaining an efficient investment pair. Further, as will be seen, these properties preserve the
flavor of the static holdup game.
We call a Markov perfect equilibrium satisfying (P) a regular equilibrium, or simply an
equilibrium. Section 5 will explore the consequences of relaxing (P), which includes a delay
in agreement and an inefficiently low investment — even lower than the underinvestment that
would arise in the static holdup game.
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3 A Motivating Example
Suppose that only the seller invests and her investment decision is binary: “invest” and “not
invest.” Much of the insight for our results can be gained in this simplified model, which also
serves to highlight that our main results hold even when the investments are discrete. Assume
that total surplus is φ = 100 if the seller invests and it is φ = 40 if she does not invest and
that the cost of investment for the seller is C ∈ (30, 50]. Hence, the investment is socially
desirable. Assume that α = 12 . The following table describes the payoff the seller receives from
bargaining in the static holdup game and in (an equilibrium) of our dynamic model.
Investment Decision Total surplus S’s gross payoff S’s gross payoff
(Static model) (Dynamic model)
Invest 100 50 50
Not invest 40 20 max{20− δC2 , δ(50− C)}
Difference 60 30 ≥ C if δ ≥ δ∗(C) := 2− 60C
As described in the third column, in the static holdup game, the seller receives one half of the
total surplus, whether she invests or not. Hence, she enjoys the marginal return of 30 = 50−20
from the investment. Since this return falls short of the investment cost of C > 30, the seller
will never invest in equilibrium. This describes the classic “underinvestment” problem arising
from holdup.
Now consider our dynamic model. Suppose first that the seller invests. Then, the realizable
total surplus is fixed at 100 for the rest of the game, since no higher investment is feasible and
disinvestment is not allowed. The ensuing subgame then simply coincides with the standard
(random-proposer) Rubinstein game with a fixed pie. Hence, along this path, the seller’s payoff
(gross of the investment cost) is one half of the total surplus, 50. Notice that the seller is held
up even in the dynamic model, in terms of her absolute payoff.
The holdup need not imply that the seller will choose “not invest” in our model, however.
The seller’s incentive also depends on the payoff she receives when she chooses “not invest.”
That payoff, in turn, depends on the belief held by the players regarding whether the seller
will invest in the next period if no agreement is reached in the current period. Suppose that
the seller is expected to invest in the next period. This means that the seller will incur the
cost of C and split 100 equally (as argued above), so her (discounted) continuation value will
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be δ(50 − C). Likewise, the buyer’s continuation value following “not invest” and rejection
will be 50δ. With probability 12 , the buyer makes an offer. In this event, he offers either the
seller’s continuation value of δ(50 − C) or an amount that will lead to rejection, whichever is
more profitable. The resulting payoff to the seller is δ(50 − C) either way. Likewise, if the
seller makes an offer (which occurs with probability 12), she offers 50δ or any rejectable amount,
which yields the payoff of max{40− 50δ, δ(50− C)} for the seller.
Combining the terms, the expected (gross) payoff for the seller is max{20− δC2 , δ(50−C)}
following “not invest,” given the belief that she will invest next period. Hence, the seller’s
marginal return from investment is 50−max{20−δC2 , δ(50−C)} = min{30+δC2 , (1−δ)50+δC},
which exceeds the cost of C if δ ≥ δ∗(C) = 2 − 60C . (Note δ∗(C) < 1 for any C in the
relevant range.) If δ ≥ δ∗(C), the seller will indeed have an incentive to invest given the
aforementioned belief, which in turn validates the belief itself. In sum, “invest” can be sustained
as an equilibrium in our dynamic model if δ ≥ δ∗(C). In this equilibrium, the seller is held up
when she invests, but she is held up even more severely when she does not invest, due to the
unfavorable, but credible, belief. For instance, δ∗(C) = 12 if C = 40. In that case, investment
would not occur in the static holdup game, but it is sustainable for any δ ≥ 12 .
Several remarks are worth making. First, “not invest” is also supported as an equilibrium,
by the belief that the seller will never invest in the future if they disagree. Our claim is
thus not that holdup will never entail inefficiency, but rather that it need not. Second, the
example shows that efficiency is achieved even when the investment decision is binary and it
is one sided. This feature, as mentioned above, contrasts with the efficiency result obtained in
Marx and Matthews, which requires the presence of multiple investors with more than binary
investment choices. Finally, the example can be modified to illustrate the other main theme
of the current paper: Holdup can unambiguously lead to inefficiency when there is imbalance
between a party’s bargaining power and his investment cost. Suppose the investment cost is
C ∈ (50, 60). In this case, the seller’s investment is socially desirable, yet it cannot be sustained
in our dynamic model, for any δ ∈ [0, 1).13 This example shows that the investor’s individual
rationality, i.e., whether her equilibrium payoff at least covers her investment cost, plays an
important role for the efficiency consequence of holdup.
13The seller would earn 50−C < 0 if she invests, whereas if she does not invest, she can guarantee herself at
least zero payoff by repeatedly rejecting any offer. This point is also seen by a profitable one-period deviation:
The seller would earn from deviate no less than δ(50− C) > 50− C.
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4 The Analysis of the Dynamic Holdup Game
We now turn to our general model. We characterize the set of regular equilibria, beginning
with the necessary conditions.
4.1 Necessary Conditions
Let 〈β, σ,E〉 be a (regular) equilibrium. A direct consequence of (P)-(i) is that E(b, s) is a
fixed point of E(·, ·): E (E(b, s)) = E(b, s). This means that, on a (regular) equilibrium path,
the parties invest only in the first period, if at all. Delays are inefficient when no further
investments are expected, so trade will occur immediately, as is shown below.
Lemma 1 (No Delay) Starting from any stock, trade must occur immediately (i.e., in the
same period) on the equilibrium path.
Proof. Let (b, s) be the stock by the end of period t and let (b′, s′) = E(b, s). The fixed
point property implies that E(b′, s′) = (b′, s′). Suppose, contrary to the claim, that no trade
occurs in period t+ 1. Then,
φ(b′, s′) ≤ δ[β(b′, s′) + σ(b′, s′)]. (5)
Hence, it follows from (1) and (2) that
β(b′, s′) = δβ(b′, s′) and σ(b′, s′) = δσ(b′, s′),
which implies that
β(b′, s′) = σ(b′, s′) = 0. (6)
However, (6) contradicts (5) since φ(·, ·) > 0. Consequently, trade must occur in period t+ 1
in equilibrium. Q.E.D.
Note that delay can still occur off the equilibrium path if further investments can raise φ suf-
ficiently to cover both the additional investment expenses and the delay costs (i.e., discounting
of future surplus). We next consider further necessary conditions.
Suppose that E(0, 0) = (bˆ, sˆ), i.e., (bˆ, sˆ) is an equilibrium pair, starting with a stock of
(0, 0). Since E(bˆ, sˆ) = (bˆ, sˆ) and trade occurs at (bˆ, sˆ) by Lemma 1, the game at that point
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reduces to the standard (random-proposer) bargaining game with an exogenously given pie
equal to φ(bˆ, sˆ). The latter game yields the unique (subgame-perfect) equilibrium payoffs of
β(bˆ, sˆ) = αφ(bˆ, sˆ) and σ(bˆ, sˆ) = (1− α)φ(bˆ, sˆ) (7)
for the buyer and the seller, respectively. (These payoffs can also be obtained directly, by
substituting E(bˆ, sˆ) = (bˆ, sˆ) into (1) and (2) using Lemma 1.) Note that these are precisely the
payoffs that the parties would receive in the static holdup game, if they had invested (bˆ, sˆ) in
equilibrium. As we will show below, this resemblance to the static holdup outcome does not
imply that the parties will have the same incentives to invest in the dynamic holdup game,
since the bargaining terms need not satisfy (7) off the equilibrium path, i.e., when a party
deviates from his equilibrium investment level.
Since each party has the option of making no investment and ensuring himself at least zero
payoff, we must have that αφ(bˆ, sˆ)− bˆ ≥ 0 and (1− α)φ(bˆ, sˆ)− sˆ ≥ 0. By the strict concavity
of φ, this implies that
bˆ ∈ [0, B(sˆ)] and sˆ ∈ [0, S(bˆ)] (8)
where αφ(B(s), s)−B(s) ≡ 0 and (1−α)φ(b, S(b))−S(b) ≡ 0. We refer to these two conditions
as individual rationality constraints. The set of pairs satisfying these constraints is denoted by
IR(α), and is graphically described as an area upper-bounded by B(·) and S(·) in Figures 1
and 2 for the case in which the buyer’s bargaining power is large and for the case it is small
(α close to 0), respectively.14
[Insert Figures 1 and 2 about here.]
Note that B(·) and S(·) are nondecreasing and that IR(α) varies with α. As the bargaining
power of the buyer (α) decreases, the condition is easier to satisfy for the seller but more
difficult to satisfy for the buyer. For instance, the investment pair (bδ, sδ) satisfies the buyer’s
individual rationality in Figure 1 but not in Figure 2. In particular, as α tends to 0, no positive
investment by the buyer can be sustained.
Next, we derive some incentive constraints. Again, let E(0, 0) = (bˆ, sˆ) and assume bˆ > 0.
Suppose that the buyer deviates unilaterally by investing less than the target, say b < bˆ
(while the seller chooses sˆ). Given (P)-(i), E(b, sˆ) = (bˆ, sˆ). That is, following the deviation,
the seller expects that the buyer would invest the remainder (bˆ − b) in the next period if no
agreement were reached in the current period. If b is sufficiently close to bˆ, then trade will
14Note that both figures assume φbs ≡ 0.
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occur immediately since the delay costs exceed the gains from further investments. Using
E(E(b, sˆ)) = E(b, sˆ) = (bˆ, sˆ) (which again follows from (P)-(i)), we can compute the buyer’s
payoff following the deviation to b < bˆ (for b sufficiently close to bˆ):
β(b, sˆ) = α[φ(b, sˆ)− δ(1− α)φ(bˆ, sˆ)] + (1− α)δ[αφ(bˆ, sˆ)− (bˆ− b)]
= αφ(b, sˆ)− (1− α)δ(bˆ− b).
The first term in the right-hand side represents a share of the (reduced) pie resulting from
the deviation (i.e., underinvestment relative to bˆ). This term appears in the static holdup
game as well, and it constitutes the only incentive for the buyer’s investment in that game.
The second term is new in the dynamic game and it reflects the buyer’s weakened bargaining
position resulting from the equilibrium belief that he will make up for the shortfall of (bˆ − b)
next period, in the event of disagreement. The presence of this second term will be seen later
as sustaining a higher investment level than in the static holdup game.
Since the deviation must be unprofitable, β(bˆ, sˆ)− bˆ− [β(b, sˆ)− b] ≥ 0 for b < bˆ. Dividing
both sides by bˆ − b and letting b approach bˆ from below, we obtain the buyer’s incentive
constraint:
αφb(bˆ, sˆ)− [1− (1− α)δ] ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ bˆ ≤ Bδ(sˆ). (9)
Applying the same argument for the seller, we obtain:
(1− α)φs(bˆ, sˆ)− [1− αδ] ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ sˆ ≤ Sδ(bˆ). (10)
The incentive constraints, (9) and (10), impose a further upper bound on the total investments
sustainable in equilibrium, in addition to individual rationality, (8). As will be seen in the
next proposition, (P)-(ii) serves to further narrow down the set of regular equilibria, in this
case providing lower bounds on investments. Combining all the observations, the following
proposition shows that any regular equilibrium investment pair must be in the set:
Ω := {(b, s) ∈ R2+|b ∈ [B0(s),min{B(s), Bδ(s)}] and s ∈ [S0(b),min{S(b), Sδ(b)}]},
which is graphed as shaded areas in Figures 1 and 2. (Ω depends on (α, δ) but this dependence
is suppressed for simplicity.)
Proposition 1 In (regular) equilibrium, E(0, 0) ∈ Ω.
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Proof. Fix a regular equilibrium and let (bˆ, sˆ) = E(0, 0). We have already argued that (bˆ, sˆ)
must lie weakly below min{B(·), Bδ(·)} and min{S(·), Sδ(·)}.
Here we show that, in addition, (bˆ, sˆ) must lie weakly above B0(·) and S0(·). Suppose, to
the contrary, that bˆ < B0(sˆ). Since (bˆ, sˆ) = E(bˆ, sˆ), by (P)-(i), the equilibrium payoff for the
buyer is β(bˆ, sˆ)− bˆ = αφ(bˆ, sˆ)− bˆ. Consider a unilateral deviation by the buyer to b ∈ (bˆ, B0(sˆ)].
By (P)-(ii), x(b, sˆ) = b, and by (P)-(i), E(b, y(b, sˆ)) = (b, y(b, sˆ)). Using these two facts, the
deviation payoff satisfies:
β(b, sˆ)− b ≥ αφ(b, sˆ) + αδ(y(b, sˆ)− sˆ)− b
≥ αφ(b, sˆ)− b
> αφ(bˆ, sˆ)− bˆ
= β(bˆ, sˆ)− bˆ,
where the first inequality holds since trading immediately after the deviation may not be
optimal, the second holds since y(b, sˆ) ≥ sˆ, and the last (strict) inequality holds since b ∈
(bˆ, B0(sˆ)] and φ(·, sˆ) is strictly concave. Hence, the deviation is strictly profitable, which is a
contradiction to the fact that (bˆ, sˆ) = E(0, 0). Q.E.D.
Note that Ω is nonempty, since B0(·) ≤ min{B(·), Bδ(·)} and S0(·) ≤ min{S(·), Sδ(·)}.
4.2 Sufficient Conditions
We now provide sufficient conditions for a (regular) equilibrium. In the case of (weakly)
substitutable investments, the necessary conditions for a regular equilibrium characterized in
Proposition 1 are also sufficient.
Proposition 2 If the investments are (weak) substitutes, then any pair in Ω can be sustained
as a (regular) equilibrium outcome. In such an equilibrium, the buyer and the seller invest
(bˆ, sˆ) ∈ Ω in the first period and agree to trade immediately. Their equilibrium payoffs are
αφ(bˆ, sˆ)− bˆ and (1− α)φ(bˆ, sˆ)− sˆ for the buyer and the seller, respectively.
Proof. See the Appendix.
To see the intuition behind this result, consider a special case where the investments are
independent (i.e., φbs(·, ·) = 0). In this case, Bδ(·) ≡ bδ and Sδ(·) ≡ sδ, i.e., the best response
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curves are perfectly inelastic. Fix any (bˆ, sˆ) ∈ Ω. That pair, (bˆ, sˆ), can be sustained as an
equilibrium by the policy rule: E(b, s) = (max{b, bˆ},max{s, sˆ}). Given this rule, the buyer,
for example, invests up to bˆ when starting from a smaller level and stops when starting from a
higher level. This is an equilibrium strategy since the buyer faces the payoff function graphed
in Figure 3.
[Insert Figure 3 about here.]
Starting with any b < bˆ, the belief that he will make up the shortfall next period means
that the buyer faces the marginal payoff described in (9):
αφb(b, sˆ)− [1− (1− α)δ],
which is strictly positive since b < bˆ ≤ bδ. Starting with b > bˆ, the belief that he will stop
investing further means that the buyer will face the marginal payoff:
αφb(b, sˆ)− 1,
which is strictly negative since b > bˆ ≥ b0. Since the same argument works for the seller, the
policy rule, E(·, ·), is sustainable.
Unlike in the case of substitutability, if investments are complementary, then not all pairs
in Ω can be sustained as a (regular) equilibrium. In particular, the static holdup outcome,
(b0, s0), can never be sustained as a regular equilibrium with complementary investments, as
shown below.
Proposition 3 If investments are strictly complementary at (b0, s0), then the static holdup
outcome, (b0, s0), cannot be sustained in any regular equilibrium.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Note that, with complementarities, the joint surplus associated with (b0, s0) is the lowest
among all pairs in Ω. Consequently, any regular equilibrium pair in our dynamic model must
be more efficient than that outcome. We now study the sustainability of the most efficient
pair in Ω. Let (bCE , sCE) denote such a pair. It follows from the strict concavity of φ and the
complementarity of the investments that (bCE , sCE) is the largest vector in Ω. In particular,
if (bδ, sδ) ∈ IR(α), then (bCE , sCE) = (bδ, sδ). Next, we provide sufficient conditions for
(bCE , sCE) to be sustained in equilibrium with complementary investments.
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Proposition 4 If investments are strictly complementary, it is an equilibrium for the parties
to choose (bCE , sCE) and trade in the first period if
sup
{∣∣∣∣φsbφss
∣∣∣∣ , ∣∣∣∣φsbφbb
∣∣∣∣} < M for some M > 0;
i.e., the degree of complementarities is sufficiently small. In particular, if (bδ, sδ) ∈ IR(α),
then the condition reduces to ∣∣∣∣φsbφss
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1− αα and
∣∣∣∣φsbφbb
∣∣∣∣ ≤ α1− α.
Proof. See the Appendix.
These conditions put a bound on the degree of complementarities. In particular, if (bδ, sδ)
satisfies the individual rationality constraint, the bound has an intuitive expression. Strict
concavity of φ implies that
φbbφss > φ
2
bs ⇔
∣∣∣∣φsbφss
∣∣∣∣ ∣∣∣∣φsbφbb
∣∣∣∣ < 1,
so, if |φsbφss | > 1−αα , then |
φsb
φbb
| < α1−α , implying that at least one of the two latter conditions
must hold. In fact, if both parties have equal bargaining power and φ(b, s) is symmetric in
(b, s), then all the sufficient conditions are satisfied.
Corollary 1 If α = 12 and φ(b, s) is symmetric in (b, s), then it is an equilibrium for the
parties to choose (bδ, sδ) and trade in the first period.
Proof. Given α = 12 and the symmetry, bδ = sδ. Since φ(bδ, sδ)− bδ − sδ > 0, this implies
that (bδ, sδ) ∈ IR(α). Further, by concavity of φ,
∣∣∣φsbφss ∣∣∣ ∣∣∣φsbφbb ∣∣∣ ≤ 1, which, together with the
symmetry, implies that
∣∣∣φsbφss ∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣φsbφbb ∣∣∣ ≤ 1. Thus, the claim follows directly from Proposition 4.
Q.E.D.
We are now in a position to state the main result of this paper. Recall that (bδ, sδ)→ (b∗, s∗)
as δ → 1. Hence, the first-best investment pair can be sustained as a (regular) equilibrium
in the limit as δ goes to 1, provided that (b∗, s∗) satisfies the individual rationality constraint
(and the investments are not too complementary). This shows the importance of the individual
rationality constraint for the prediction of inefficiencies. Let
A ≡ {α ∈ [0, 1]|(b∗, s∗) ∈ IR(α)}
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denote the set of α’s at which (b∗, s∗) satisfies the individual rationality constraint. Since
the joint net payoff is strictly positive at (b∗, s∗), individual rationality must hold for at least
one party for any α, and it must hold for both for some values of α. Hence, A is nonempty.
Further, it is convex (i.e., forms an interval), and if α ∈ A, then (bδ, sδ) ∈ IR(α) for all
δ ∈ [0, 1). Most importantly, A does not include the extreme values of α = 0 and α = 1,
if (b∗, s∗) >> (0, 0). Intuitively, individual rationality fails when one party has a very weak
bargaining power relative to the cost of his first-best investment decision;, i.e., when there is an
imbalance between one’s bargaining power and the social value of his investment. Our results
are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 5 If α ∈ A and −φsbφss ≤ 1−αα and −
φsb
φbb
≤ α1−α , then the first-best equilibrium pair
can be sustained asymptotically as δ → 1. If α 6∈ A, then any regular equilibrium investment
pair is bounded away from (b∗, s∗) for any δ ∈ [0, 1). In particular, any regular equilibrium pair
(if it exists) approaches to the static one if either α→ 0 or α→ 1.
Two implications can be drawn from this result. First, the holdup problem need not entail
inefficiencies in our dynamic environment. The artificial separation between the investment
and bargaining stages is what rules out efficiency in the static holdup game. At first glance,
such an artificial separation appears only to serve as a modelling convenience. Yet, once we
dispense with that feature and analyze holdup in a more realistic dynamic model, inefficien-
cies may vanish altogether. Second, the result sheds new light on the conditions needed for
an unambiguous prediction of inefficiencies. In particular, it is the failure of the individual
rationality constraint that causes all equilibria to be bounded away from efficiency. While
this failure of individual rationality can be attributed to the imbalance between the investor’s
bargaining power and the social value of his investment, this insight for inefficiencies differs
from the standard one offered by the static model. In particular, there need not be any con-
nection between the extent to which a party is held up and the level of investment he makes
in equilibrium. For instance, if a party’s individual rationality constraint is almost binding at
the first-best pair, he can still be induced to invest efficiently even though by doing so he will
earn almost zero payoff (and will thus be much more severely held up than he would be in the
static equilibrium).
Remark 1 In public good provision, only the total contribution of the agents matters, so the
investments are perfect substitutes. While our strict concavity assumption rules out this case,
19
our result continues to hold even in that case. In fact, the result is strengthened: Asymptotic
efficiency holds for any α ∈ [0, 1] if the investments are perfect substitutes. To see this, suppose
that φ(b, s) = ψ(b+s) for some strictly concave function ψ(·). Letting z∗ := argmaxz≥0 ψ(z)−z,
any (b, s) such that b+s = z∗ constitutes the first-best outcome. Let Z∗ denote the set of all such
pairs. Clearly, for any α ∈ [0, 1], there exists a first-best pair (b, s) ∈ Z∗ satisfying individual
rationality. As before, Proposition 2 holds and implies that any pair in Ω is sustainable. It
can be then easily checked that, any pair in Z∗ ∩ IR(α) is approached by a pair in Ω as
δ → 1.15 Intuitively, if one agent’s investment is just as good as the other’s, they can allocate
the investment responsibilities to reflect their relative bargaining positions, i.e., by assigning a
higher investment responsibility to the agent with a stronger bargaining power.
Remark 2 While investments and trade take place in the first period in our equilibria (thus
as in static models), the sustainability of these equilibria rests on the infinite horizon. For
instance, our asymptotic efficiency result depends on the out-of-equilibrium belief that any
party who deviates to invest less than his target level will make up the short-fall in the next
period. In a finite horizon model, such a belief will not be credible in the last period. Hence,
the asymptotic efficiency result cannot be sustained in a finite-horizon model. Curiously, the
same issue arises in the contribution games literature.16 This feature implies that these types
of results are most relevant in the circumstances where the time horizon is either infinite or
uncertain.
5 Nonregular equilibria
Our refinement, (P), has so far limited the role of non-passive out-of-equilibrium beliefs. We
show here that relaxing this refinement admits additional equilibria that involve delay and
inefficiently low investments, even lower than the level predicted in the static holdup game.
5.1 Sub-static Investments
Relaxing (P)-(ii) admits a nonregular equilibrium in which a party invests strictly less than
in the static holdup game (i.e., outside the set of potential regular equilibria identified in
15Note that the sets {(b, s)|b = Bδ(s)} and {(b, s)|s = Sδ(b)} both converge to Z∗ as δ → 1.
16The asymptotic efficiency result of Marx and Matthews in the “no-payoff jump” case (which corresponds
to the situation considered in our model) also unravels in the finite-horizon setting.
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Proposition 1). Such an equilibrium can be sustained by the (out-of-equilibrium) belief that,
following an upward deviation, the deviator will invest even more.17
This point can be illustrated in a model with one-sided investment. Suppose that only the
buyer invests. Let φ(b) represent the surplus of trade following the total investment of b by
the buyer and define bδ and B (which is now a constant) as before. Now consider the set of
possible investments:
Ω¯ := [bL,min{bδ, B}],
where bL := min{b ≥ 0 | αφ(b)− b ≥ max{αφ(bδ)− bδ, 0}}. Clearly, bL < b0 whenever b0 > 0
since αφ(b0) − b0 = maxb{αφ(b) − b} > max{αφ(bδ) − bδ, 0}. In short, the set Ω¯ contains
investment levels lower than the static equilibrium level, b0.
One can easily check that any investment level in this set, say bˆ ∈ Ω¯, can be sustained as
a Markov Perfect equilibrium, with the policy rule:
x(b) =

bˆ if b ≤ bˆ,
min{bδ, B} if b ∈ (bˆ,min{bδ, B}]
b if b > min{bδ, B}.
Notice that any upward deviation is followed by a further jump to the highest sustainable
level, min{bδ, B}, which punishes such a deviation more than would any response permitted
by (P)-(ii).18 Hence, a lower investment than the static equilibrium level can be sustained in
a non-regular equilibrium. To be concrete, suppose φ(b) = 1 + 2
√
b and α = δ = 12 . Then, the
set of regular equilibria is Ω = [14 ,
4
9 ], while the set of Markov Perfect equilibria is Ω¯ = [
1
9 ,
4
9 ].
5.2 Delay
Relaxing (P)-(i) can give rise to a delayed agreement. The reason can be described as a
coordination failure. When her partner plans to make a substantial investment in the future,
a given party finds it optimal to delay trade until after that investment has been made, which
makes it optimal to delay her own investment. Condition (P)-(i) rules out such a coordination
failure.
17Recall that such a belief is not allowed by (P)-(ii), which restricts the deviator to stop investing further
after an upward deviation.
18In the one-sided investment case, jumping to min{bδ, B} constitutes the worst sustainable punishment,
which implies that indeed Ω¯ is the full set of Markov Perfect equilibria.
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Proposition 6 Assume that investments are weak substitutes (i.e., φbs ≤ 0).19 There exists
δˆ < 1 such that for any δ > δˆ, it is a Markov Perfect equilibrium for the parties to initially
invest some sufficiently small amounts, (ν, ) << (b0, s0), disagree at the end of that period,
and invest next period to (b0, s0) and trade.
Proof. See the Appendix.
6 Conclusion
The current paper has reexamined an important foundation of modern organizational theory:
the holdup problem. When parties negotiate ex post to determine the terms of trade, they
split the ex post trading surplus, so a party can be seen as appropriating only a fraction,
say a half, of the return to his sunk investment in terms of absolute payoff. It would then
follow, according to the conventional wisdom, that the investor would appropriate only half
of the marginal return to his investment, from which underinvestment would follow. We have
shown that this link between absolute and marginal appropriability is an artifact of the rigid
separation of the investment and bargaining stages assumed in the static model. Once we
allow the two stages to be intertwined in a realistic fashion (by permitting the investments to
continue until bargaining concludes), the fact that the parties split their trading surplus need
not imply poor marginal incentives for their investment decisions. In particular, in the limit
when the parties are extremely patient, the first-best investment decisions can be supported
as an equilibrium as long as the parties recoup their investment costs from the negotiation.
Several implications can be drawn from these results. First, the holdup problem may not
be as worrisome as may have been thought previously, even in the absence of ex ante contracts.
In particular, our asymptotic efficiency result implies that agents may choose not to contract
ex ante even in the presence of negligible transaction costs. This may explain why contracts
are incomplete, in particular, why business transactions seldom rely on explicit contracts (see
Macaulay (1963)).20 Second, our theory suggests that, even when underinvestment occurs,
19A similar argument can be made for complementary investments, subject to the extra complication noted
earlier.
20A similar result has been established by Che and Hausch (1999), Segal (1999) and Hart and Moore (1999).
These papers show that contracts can do little to overcome the inefficiencies caused by the holdup problem.
By contrast, our result rests on the finding that investment dynamics alone can solve the incentive problem,
thus making ex ante contracts unnecessary. Remarkably, the features that make contracts ineffective in the
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it may result from an investor not earning enough from bargaining to recoup the cost of his
socially desirable investment. This suggests that “individual-rationality-type considerations”
should be an important part of contract and organization design. In particular, inefficiencies
may be eliminated simply by restoring one’s bargaining position to guarantee sufficiently high
bargaining revenue for that party. The latter may be accomplished by simple instruments, such
as (re)allocating decision rights and/or (re)drawing the boundary of agents’ authority within
an organization, or by the courts’ assigning the legal default rights appropriately. This seems to
suggest that our dynamic model can serve as a tighter, and thus more successful, foundation for
understanding the observed nature of contractual incompleteness, than its extant counterpart.
aforementioned papers (e.g., “cooperative investments” and/or environmental “complexities”) do not disrupt
efficiency here even in the absence of ex ante contracts!
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7 Appendix A: Proofs
We first establish sufficient conditions under which a pair in Ω can be implemented as a regular
equilibrium. For a pair, (bˆ, sˆ) ∈ Ω, suppose that there exist functions Bˆ(·) : [bˆ,∞)→ R+ and
Sˆ(·) : [sˆ,∞)→ R+ that satisfy the following conditions:
(A1) Bˆ(sˆ) = bˆ and Sˆ(bˆ) = sˆ;
(A2) Bˆ(s) ∈ [B0(s),min{B(s), Bδ(s)}] for any s ≥ sˆ and Sˆ(b) ∈ [S0(b),min{S(b), Sδ(b)}] for
all b ≥ bˆ;
(A3) Bˆ(·) and Sˆ(·) are differentiable almost everywhere, and Bˆ′(·)φbs(·) ≥ 0 and Sˆ′(·)φbs(·) ≥
0.
(A4) If φbs(·) ≥ 0 (i.e., complementary investments), then
α
[
φb(b, Sˆ(b)) + δSˆ′(b)
]
− 1 ≤ 0 and αδ
[
φb(b, Sˆ(b)) + φs(b, Sˆ(b))Sˆ′(b)
]
− 1 ≤ 0 for b ≥ bˆ,
and
(1−α)[φs(Bˆ(s), s)+δBˆ′(s)]−1 ≤ 0 and (1−α)δ[φs(Bˆ(s), s)+φb(Bˆ(s), s)Bˆ′(s)]−1 ≤ 0 for s ≥ sˆ.
The first three conditions are trivial to satisfy by themselves for any (bˆ, sˆ) ∈ Ω. The
last condition imposes a nontrivial restriction on the degree of investment complementarities.
Consider the following policy rule:
(A5) Eˆ(b, s) =

(b, s) if b ≥ Bˆ(s) and s ≥ Sˆ(b),
(bˆ, sˆ) if (b, s) ≤ (bˆ, sˆ),
(b, Sˆ(b)) if b > bˆ and s ≤ Sˆ(b),
(Bˆ(s), s) if b ≤ Bˆ(s) and s > sˆ.
Lemma A1 For any (bˆ, sˆ) ∈ Ω, if there exist Bˆ(·) and Sˆ(·) satisfying (A1) − (A4), then
it is equilibrium behavior for the parties to invest according to the rule, Eˆ(·, ·), and to trade
immediately.
Proof. We prove that a deviation is unprofitable in each case.
(i) b ≥ Bˆ(s) and s ≥ Sˆ(b): If both parties follow the investment rule, Eˆ(b, s) = (b, s).
Substituting this into (1) gives the equilibrium payoff of the buyer (excluding sunk investment
cost): αφ(b, s). Suppose now that the buyer unilaterally deviates by choosing b˜ > b. Applying
the one-period deviation principle, trade must occur (by Lemma 1) and the resulting payoff for
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the buyer is αφ(b˜, s)− (b˜− b). Such a deviation is unprofitable since αφ(b˜, s)− b˜ < αφ(b, s)− b,
for b˜ > b > Bˆ(s) ≥ B0(s). A symmetric argument holds for the seller’s deviation.
(ii) (b, s) ≤ (bˆ, sˆ): Since Eˆ(bˆ, sˆ) = (bˆ, sˆ), the equilibrium payoff for the buyer is β(bˆ, sˆ)− bˆ =
αφ(bˆ, sˆ) − bˆ. Suppose now that the buyer deviates by investing just b˜ < bˆ (such a deviation
is feasible only if b < bˆ). Suppose that trade occurs following such a deviation. Substituting
En(b˜, sˆ) = (bˆ, sˆ), n ≥ 1, into (1) then gives the buyer’s deviation payoff:
β(b˜, sˆ)− (b˜− b) = αφ(b˜, sˆ)− (1− α)δ(bˆ− b˜)− (b˜− b)
Such a deviation is unprofitable since the right-hand side is strictly increasing in b˜ (since
b˜ < bˆ ≤ Bδ(sˆ)) and equals αφ(bˆ, sˆ)− (bˆ− b) when b˜ = bˆ. If trade does not occur following the
deviation, then, since Eˆ2(b˜, sˆ) = Eˆ(b˜, sˆ) = (bˆ, sˆ), the deviation payoff is simply
β(b˜, sˆ)− (b˜− b) = δ(αφ(bˆ, sˆ)− (bˆ− b˜))− (b˜− b)
≤ αφ(bˆ, sˆ)− (bˆ− b)
= β(bˆ, sˆ)− (bˆ− b),
where the inequality follows from (bˆ, sˆ) ∈ IR(α) and δ < 1. We again conclude that such a
deviation is unprofitable.
Now consider a deviation to b˜ > bˆ. Again, if trade occurs after the deviation, then the
resulting payoff for the buyer is
β(b˜, sˆ)− (b˜− b) = αφ(b˜, sˆ) + αδ(max{Sˆ(b˜)− sˆ, 0})− (b˜− b)
= αφ(bˆ, sˆ)− (bˆ− b) +
∫ b˜
bˆ
[αφb(b′, sˆ)− 1 + αδmax{Sˆ′(b′), 0}] db′
≤ αφ(bˆ, sˆ)− (bˆ− b)
= β(bˆ, sˆ)− (bˆ− b),
where the inequality follows since αφb(b′, sˆ)− 1 ≤ 0 and Sˆ′(·) ≤ 0 if φbs ≤ 0, and since, for any
b′ ≥ bˆ,
αφb(b′, sˆ)− 1 + αδSˆ′(b′) ≤ αφb(b′, Sˆ(b′))− 1 + αδSˆ′(b′) ≤ 0,
if φbs ≥ 0.21 The above result proves that such a deviation is unprofitable. Suppose now that
trade does not occur after the deviation. Since Eˆ2(b˜, sˆ) = Eˆ(b˜, sˆ) = (b˜, Sˆ(b˜)), the deviation
payoff is
δαφ(b˜, Sˆ(b˜))− (b˜− b),
21The first inequality holds since Sˆ′(·) ≥ 0 and the second inequality holds by (A4).
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which, by (A4), is nonincreasing in b˜ and attains a value less than β(bˆ, sˆ)− (b− bˆ) when b˜ = bˆ.
A symmetric argument holds for s with respect to both types of deviation.
(iii) b > bˆ and s ≤ Sˆ(b): The equilibrium payoff for the buyer is αφ(b, Sˆ(b)) and (1 −
α)φ(b, Sˆ(b))− (Sˆ(b)− s) for the seller. Consider any deviation by the buyer to b˜ > b. Again,
(A4) ensures that no profitable deviation exists for the buyer. Its proof follows almost exactly
the same line of argument as in the second part of (ii) and is omitted.
Suppose now that the seller deviates to s˜. Assuming an immediate trade, the resulting
payoff is
σ(b, s˜)− (s˜− s) =
 (1− α)φ(b, s˜)− αδ(Sˆ(b)− s˜)− (s˜− s) if s˜ < Sˆ(b),(1− α)φ(b, s˜)− (s˜− s) if s˜ > Sˆ(b).
Again, such a deviation is unprofitable since the first line of the RHS is increasing in s˜ (since
s˜ < Sˆ(b) ≤ Sδ(b)), and its second line is decreasing in s˜ (since s˜ > Sˆ(b) ≥ S0(b)), and
they both equal the equilibrium payoff when s˜ = Sˆ(b). Trade must occur after a deviation
if s˜ > Sˆ(b). If s˜ < Sˆ(b), then no trade is a possibility but its resulting payoff is simply
δ[(1−α)φ(b, Sˆ(b))− (Sˆ(b)− s˜)]− (s˜− s) ≤ (1−α)φ(b, Sˆ(b))− (Sˆ(b)− s) by (A2), so again no
such deviation is profitable.
(iv) This case mirrors (iii), so the same proof applies with roles of the seller and the buyer
switched. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: When the investments are weak substitutes (φbs ≤ 0), only
(A1)-(A3) need to be satisfied. Note that for any (bˆ, sˆ) in Ω, there exists (δ1, δ2) ∈ [0, δ]2 such
that bˆ = Bδ1(sˆ) and that sˆ = Sδ2(bˆ). Define Bˆ(s) = Bδ1(s) for s ≥ sˆ and Sˆ(b) = Sδ2(b) for
b ≥ bˆ. Then, Bˆ and Sˆ are nonincreasing and differentiable almost everywhere, so they satisfy
(A1) and (A3). Since (δ1, δ2) ∈ [0, δ]2 and Bˆ and Sˆ are nonincreasing (whereas B and S are
nondecreasing), (A2) also holds. Therefore, the proposition holds by Lemma A1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: Suppose to the contrary that (b0, s0) = E(0, 0) for some regular
equilibrium 〈β, σ,E〉. In equilibrium, the buyer receives β(b0, s0) = αφ(b0, s0)− b0. Consider a
unilateral deviation by the buyer to b > b0. By (P)-(ii), we have x(b, s0) = b and, by (P)-(i),
we have E(E(b, s0)) = E(b, s0). Hence, the (gross) deviation payoff satisfies
β(b, s0) ≥ αφ(b, s0) + αδ(y(b, s0)− s0)
≥ αφ(b, s0) + αδ(S0(b)− S0(b0)),
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where the first inequality holds since trade may not follow the deviation and the second in-
equality follows since, by an argument like that of Proposition 1, y(b, s0) ≥ S0(b). Since the
above inequality must hold for any b > bˆ, we have
lim inf
b↓b0
β(b, s0)− β(b0, s0)
b− b0 ≥ αφb(b0, s0) + αδS
′
0(b0)
> αφb(b0, s0)
= 1,
where the second inequality follows from S′0(b0) > 0 (implied by the complementarity) and the
equality follows from b0 = B0(s0). These inequalities imply that there exists b (> b0) to which
the buyer strictly prefers to deviate. We thus have a contradiction. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4: Set (bˆ, sˆ) := (bCE , sCE) and let
Bˆ(s) := max{bCE , B0(s)} ∀s ≥ sCE and Sˆ(b) := max{sCE , S0(b)} ∀b ≥ bCE .
Then, the associated policy rule, Eˆ, defined in (A5) satisfies (A1)-(A3), so it suffices to check
(A4). For b ∈ [bCE , S−10 (sCE)], Sˆ(b) is flat, so we have
α[φb(b, Sˆ(b)) + δSˆ′(b)]− 1 = αφb(b, Sˆ(b))− 1 ≤ 0,
where the last inequality follows from b ≥ B0(Sˆ(b)). Thus the condition is satisfied. For
b > S−10 (sCE), the expression in question is
α[φb(b, S0(b)) + δS′0(b)]− 1 < αφb(b, S0(b))− 1 + αM. (11)
Observe that αφb(b, S0(b))− 1 < 0 at b = S−10 (sCE) > B0(sCE). Hence, for some M > 0, the
RHS in (11) is nonpositive. Since αφb(b, S0(b)) is nonincreasing (by the concavity of φ), for
the same M > 0, the expression in (11) remains nonpositive for all b > S−10 (sCE). Therefore,
there exists M > 0 such that the first part of (A4) holds. By the symmetric argument, the
second part of (A4) holds for some M > 0.
We now turn to the case in which (bδ, sδ) ∈ IR(α). Set Bˆ(s) = Bδ(s) for s ≥ sδ and
Sˆ(b) = Sδ(b) for b ≥ bδ. Again, it suffices to check (A4).
α[φb(b, Sˆ(b)) + δSˆ′(b)]− 1 = α[φb(b, Sδ(b)) + δS′δ(b)]− 1
≤ α[φb(bδ, sδ)) + δS′δ(b)]− 1
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≤ α
[
φb(bδ, sδ)) + δ
1− α
α
]
− 1
= αφb(bδ, sδ))− (1− (1− α)δ)
= 0,
where the first inequality follows from b ≥ Bδ(Sδ(b)) (by our assumption of a unique intersection
of Bδ and Sδ), and the second follows from the hypothesis.
Likewise,
δα[φb(b, Sˆ(b)) + φs(b, Sˆ(b))Sˆ′(b)]− 1 = δα[φb(b, Sδ(b)) + φs(b, Sδ(b))S′δ(b)]− 1
= δα
[
φb(b, Sδ(b)) +
1− αδ
1− α S
′
δ(b)
]
− 1
≤ δα
[
φb(bδ, sδ) +
1− αδ
α
]
− 1
= δ
[
αφb(bδ, sδ)− 1− δ
δ
− αδ
]
≤ δ [αφb(bδ, sδ)− (1− (1− α)δ)]
= 0.
Symmetric proofs hold for the derivatives with respect to s. The proof is then complete by
invoking Lemma A1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6: Set (bˆ, sˆ) := (b0, s0) and let
Bˆ(s) := B0(s) ∀s ≥ s0 and Sˆ(b) := S0(b) ∀b ≥ bo.
Then, the associated policy rule, Eˆ, defined in (A5) is sustainable as a Markov Perfect equi-
librium.22 Consider now a modified policy rule:
Eˆd(b, s) ≡ 〈xˆd(b, s), yˆd(b, s)〉 ≡
 (ν, ) if (b, s) < (ν, ),Eˆ(b, s) otherwise,
for some (ν, ) << (b0, s0).
Given this rule, the parties first invest to (ν, ), delay agreement for one period, and then
they invest up to (b0, s0) next period and trade immediately. We show that there exists δˆ < 1
such that, for any δ ≥ δˆ, Eˆd is sustainable as a Markov Perfect equilibrium.
22Observe that Bˆ(s) and Sˆ(b) satisfy (A1)-(A4) (with (A4) being satisfied by default since φbs ≤ 0), so the
sustainability of Eˆ follows from Lemma A1.
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Observe first that, since (ν, ) << (b0, s0), there exists δˆ1 < 1 such that, for any δ ≥ δˆ1,
φ(ν, ) ≤ δ[φ(b0, s0)− (b0 − ν)− (s0 − )].
This means that, for such a δ, the parties will indeed choose to delay agreement after arriving
at (ν, ).
We now show that there is no profitable deviation from Eˆd, for a sufficiently high δ. Con-
sider any starting stock (b, s). If (b, s) 6< (ν, ), then the policy rule, Eˆd(b′, s′) coincides with
Eˆ(b′, s′) for any (b′, s′) ≥ (b, s). Then, Lemma A1 proves immediately that no deviation
from Eˆd is strictly profitable. Therefore, we restrict attention to an arbitrary starting stock
(b, s) < (ν, ) and show that there is no profitable deviation from Eˆd in the first period. (If
no deviation occurs in the first period (i.e., if they choose (ν, )), then Eˆ again applies, so no
deviation is profitable from the second period onward.) We focus on the buyer’s incentive. If
no party deviates in the first period, the buyer’s equilibrium payoff would be
β(ν, )− (ν − b) = δ[αφ(b0, s0)− (b0 − ν)]− (ν − b). (12)
Suppose that he deviates to b˜ 6= ν. Assume first that the deviation is followed by no trade in
that period. Then, the buyer receives:
β(b˜, )− (b˜− b)
=

δ{δ[αφ(b0, s0)− (b0 − ν)]− (ν − b˜)} − (b˜− b) if b˜ < ν,
δ[αφ(b0, s0)− (b0 − b˜)]− (b˜− b) if b˜ ∈ (ν, b0]
δαφ(b˜,max{S0(b˜), })− (b˜− b) if b˜ > b0.
This deviation payoff is no greater than the RHS of (12). This holds clearly if b˜ < ν since δ < 1
(and since the expression inside the curled brackets is nonnegative). The same holds if b˜ ≥ ν
since the deviation payoff is nonincreasing in b˜ and equals to the RHS of (12) when b˜ = ν. We
thus conclude that deviation is unprofitable in this case.
Assume next that the deviation is followed by an immediate trade. Then, the buyer’s
deviation payoff equals
β(b˜, )− (b˜− b)
=

αφ(b˜, ) + αδ2(s0 − )− (1− α)δ2(b0 − ν)− (1− α)δ(ν − b˜)− (b˜− b) if b˜ < ν,
αφ(b˜, ) + αδ(max{s0 − , 0})− (1− α)δ(b0 − b˜)− (b˜− b) if b˜ ∈ [ν, b0],
αφ(b˜, ) + αδ(S0(b˜)− )− (b˜− b) if b˜ > b0,
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We first show that this deviation payoff is no greater than
αφ(b0, ) + αδ(s0 − )− (b0 − b). (13)
This result holds if b˜ < ν since
αφ(b˜, ) + αδ2(s0 − )− (1− α)δ2(b0 − ν)− (1− α)δ(ν − b˜)− (b˜− b)
≤ αφ(ν, ) + αδ2(s0 − )− (1− α)δ2(b0 − ν)− (ν − b)
≤ αφ(b0, ) + αδ2(s0 − )− (b0 − b)
≤ αφ(b0, ) + αδ(s0 − )− (b0 − b)
where the first inequality holds since the first line is nondecreasing in b˜ for b˜ ≤ ν ≤ b0 ≤ B0()
and it equals the second line when b˜ = ν, and the second inequality holds since the second
line is nondecreasing in ν for ν ≤ b0 ≤ B0() and it equals the third line when ν = b0, and the
last inequality follows from δ < 1. Suppose now b˜ ≥ ν. In this case, the deviation payoff is
nondecreasing in b˜ for b˜ ≤ b0 and nonincreasing in b˜ for b˜ ≥ b0, and it equals the expression in
(13) when b˜ = b0. Hence, again the deviation payoff is no greater than the expression in (13).
It now remains to show that, for sufficiently large δ, the expression in (13) is no greater
than the RHS of (12), the equilibrium payoff. This holds since there exists δˆ2 < 1 such that,
for any δ ≥ δˆ2,
αφ(b0, ) + αδ(s0 − )− (b0 − b)
≤ δαφ(b0, s0)− (b0 − b),
where the inequality follows from the fact that αφ(b0, )+αδ(s0−)− (b0−b) increases strictly
as  rises to s0. Since the last line equals the equilibrium payoff described in (12), the deviation
is unprofitable.
Next, applying a symmetric argument, there exists δˆ3 < 1 such that, for any δ ≥ δˆ3, there
is no profitable deviation from Eˆd by the seller.
Last, combining all observations, we conclude that for δ > δˆ ≡ max{δˆ1, δˆ2, δˆ3}, the policy
rule, Eˆd, constitutes a Markov Perfect equilibrium and a delay occurs on that path. Q.E.D.
30
References
[1] Admati, A.R., and Perry, M. (1991). “Joint Projects without Commitment,” Review of
Economic Studies, 58, 259-276.
[2] Aghion, P., and Bolton, P. (1992). “An Incomplete Contracting Approach to Financial
Contracting,” Review of Economic Studies, 59, 473-493.
[3] Aghion, P., and Tirole, J. (1997). “Formal and Real Authority in Organizations” Journal
of Political Economy, 105, 1-29.
[4] Bagnoli, M., and Lipman, B. (1989). “Provision of Public Goods: Fully Implementing the
Core through Private Contributions,” Review of Economic Studies, 56, 583-601.
[5] Binmore, K. (1987). “Perfect Equilibria in Bargaining Models” The Economics of Bar-
gaining (Binmore and Dasgupta eds.) Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 77-105.
[6] Che, Y.-K., and Hausch, D.B. (1999). “Cooperative Investments and the Value of Con-
tracting,” American Economic Review, 125-147.
[7] Dewatripont, M., and Tirole, J. (1994). “Theory of Debt and Equity: Diversity of Se-
curities and Manager-Shareholder Congruence,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109,
1027-1054.
[8] Gale, D. (2000). “Monotone Games with Positive Spillovers,” mimeo., New York Univer-
sity.
[9] Grossman, S., and Hart, O. (1986). “The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of
Lateral and Vertical Integration,” Journal of Political Economy, 94, 691-719.
[10] Grout, P.A. (1984). “Investment and Wages in the Absence of Binding Contracts: A Nash
Bargaining Approach,” Econometrica, 52, 449- 460.
[11] Hart, O.D., and Moore, J.D. (1990). “Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm,”
Journal of Political Economy, 98, 1119-1158.
[12] Hart, O.D., and Moore, J.D. (1999) “Foundations of Incomplete Contracts,” Review of
Economic Studies, 66, 115-138.
[13] Klein, B., Crawford, R., and Alchian, A. (1978). “Vertical Integration, Appropriable
Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process,” Journal of Law and Economics, 21,
297-326.
[14] Lockwood, B., and Thomas, J. (2001). “Gradualism and Irreversibility,” Review of Eco-
nomic Studies, forthcoming.
[15] Macaulay, S. (1963). “Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study,”
American Sociological Review, 28, 55-70.
[16] Marx, L.M., and Matthews, S.A. (2000). “Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public
Project,” Review of Economic Studies, 67, 327-358.
31
[17] Rubinstein, A. (1982). “Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model,” Econometrica, 50,
97-109.
[18] Shaked, A. (1994). “Opting Out: Bazaars versus Hi-Tech Markets,” Investigaciones
Econo´micas, 421-432.
[19] Segal, I.R., (1999) “Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete Con-
tracts,” Review of Economic Studies, 66, 57-82.
[20] Sutton, J. (1986). “Noncooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction,” Review of Eco-
nomic Studies, 53, 709-724.
[21] Tirole, J. (1986). “Procurement and Renegotiation,” Journal of Political Economy, 94,
235-259.
[22] Tirole, J. (1999). “Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?” Econometrica, 67, 741-
781.
[23] Williamson, O. (1979). “Transactions-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual
Relations,” Journal of Law and Economics, 22, 233-262.
32
